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The inflated measures of governmental instability 
  
 
Abstract 
Most analyzes of government instability in parliamentary democracies rests on a standard 
definition of what counts as a new government. Three criteria are used. A new government 
exists whenever there is a new Prime Minister, after the occurrence of a general election, and 
whenever the partisan composition of the government changes. Obviously fruitful in many 
respects, the definition is problematic if we are interested in the political phenomenon of 
government stability and instability; governmental durability based on the standard definition 
of governments is not a valid and useful measure of stability in many parliamentary systems. 
We argue that this measure from one perspective is too inclusive (not any change in 
government's partisan composition signifies instability), and from another angle too narrow 
(focusing almost exclusively on a government as a whole). We investigate how changes in 
conceptualization of what constitute new governments, affects the degree of instability in 
parliamentary democracies. Clearly, definitions make a difference and we demonstrate that 
countries might be characterized as unstable from one perspective, yet stable from another. 
Clearly, the commonly used definition of government used to measure government duration 
inflates instability, at least for some countries. We demonstrate that using more precise 
definitions of government longevity—ones that do not equate any changes in government's 
partisan composition as a sign of instability—yield important ramifications for the rank-order 
of countries’ governments instability.      
 
 
Keywords: government stability, partisan composition, parliamentary democracies.  
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Introduction 
Government instability have attracted the attention of political scientists for a long time (e.g. 
Laver 1974; Dodd 1974; Sanders and Herman 1977; Warwick 1979; Browne et. al 1986). 
After all the longevity and stability of governments may bare consequences, especially in 
parliamentary systems, for the degree to which governments command control over 
parliament, is able to pass its desires policies (Saalfeld, 2008), and even prevent political 
paralysis and regime failure (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004).  Scholars debated the terms 
one should use, theoretically and empirically, to discuss government instability (Browne et.al. 
1986; King et.al 1990; Budge and Keman 1990; Woldendorp et al. 2000, 2011; Müller and 
Strøm 2000; Warwick 2007; Somer-Topcu and Williams 2008, Barbieri and Vercesi, 2013, 
Huber and Martines-Gallardo, 2004), examine the causes of instability (Laver, 2003; 
Robertson, 1983), and its effects on regime support and institutional trust (Warwick, 1994), 
governance and government quality (Lijphart, 1994), policy instability (Brewer, 1983) and 
more.  
 
Throughout most of the literature, the consensual approach to define government instability 
was through measurements of government duration (Bergman et. al. 2013). To this end a 
government was defined according to the three criteria: if a new prime minister is confirmed; 
if elections occur (even if the same prime minister/government emerges); if a change is 
identified in the composition and/or parliamentary support of the government (e.g. 
Woldendorp et al. 2000, 2011; Müller and Strøm 2000; Müller-Rommel et.al. 2004; Somer-
Topcu and Williams 2008).  
 
We challenge this standard approach from several perspectives: to begin with, we argue that 
solely equating government instability with the duration of governments forces scholars to 
adopt a narrow perspective about government instability, as they only look at the government 
as a whole. Rather, we argue that in addition to government duration, one should 
operationalize instability by looking at changes in government's personnel, and more 
specifically, prime ministerial and ministerial duration, as well as by the time that lapsed from 
on election to the other. While some countries' degree of instability is not affected by our 
broadened definition, for other countries a more complex perspective is crucial. For example, 
we find countries which are characterized by short lived governments concurrent with prime 
ministers who reside for a long continuous periods of times.  
 
Thus, we contend that the three criteria above do not necessarily measure governmental 
instability. Specifically, not any change in the composition of a government should be 
regarded as an empirical manifestation of government instability.  
 
In what follows we develop a more precise and inclusive definition and measurements of 
government instability. After presenting the literature on the causes and consequences of 
government instability, and discussing at length the pitfall with the current literature we 
reconstruct the concept of government instability to be more inclusive on the one hand -
comprising measures of personnel longevity and lapsed time between election cycles - and 
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more precise on the other hands - i.e., they do not equate any partisan change as an instance 
of instability. We demonstrate that classifying countries as characterized by government 
instability is affected by our modifications.  
 
I. Determinants and consequences of government instability 
A prolific strand of literature on the causes of government instability has emerged over the 
years. Scholars who study the causes of government instability refer to various types of factors 
that impact survivability.  The first set of factors relates to the structure of government. Chief 
among these factors is the configuration of the government i.e., whether it is a single party 
government (Chiru, 2015), a minimum winning coalition, a majority cabinet or other forms 
of cabinet, which have been found to correlate significantly with government durability 
(Warwick, 1979, 1994). Dodd (1976) claims that minimum winning governments are more 
stable than non-minimum winning governments, yet Saalfeld (2008) finds minimum winning 
governments to be less stable than majority governments in general. Similarly, Walther (2017) 
also find minority government to be less stable and likewise Bergman et. al. (2013) find that 
majority cabinets are more stable in both Western Europe as well as Central Eastern Europe. 
Van-Roozendaal (1997) finds that the presence of a dominant party in the cabinet increase 
government's stability.  
 
In addition to governments' configuration, the effective number of parliamentary parties was 
also found to correlate positively with government instability such that the higher the effective 
number of parliamentary parties the greater the likelihood for governmental instability 
(Saalfeld, 2008, Taylor and Herman, 1971, Walther, 2017). Cabinet seat share, the number of 
cabinet parties, and the maximum possible government duration have all been regarded as 
potential determinants of government instability, as well (Bergman et. al. 2013, Saalfeld, 
2008).    
 
Variables that relate to the governments’ preference composition also have been regarded as 
key determinants for government instability. Generally speaking, the more ideologically 
homogenous and condense the cabinet is, the greater the likelihood it will survive for a longer 
period of time (Warwick, 1979; 1994). Scholars have used various variables to tab into the 
effect of ideological preference on instability. They measure the cabinet preference range 
(Savage, 2013), the extreme party seat share (Saalfeld, 2008), and whether the median party 
(on the first dimension) is in the government or not (Saalfeld, 2008).      
 
Savage (2013) also finds that a party system's preference structure has an effect on government 
instability. Savage argues that a polarized pattern of party competition is associated with 
greater stability since parties have no incentive to defect to the other bloc. Consequently, 
governments characterized by narrow preference range, within a narrow bloc, were more 
likely to survive in Central and Eastern Europe, than ideologically diverse cabinets, which 
were formed in a non-polarized system.  Walther (2017) finds ideological variables to be less 
crucial for government stability in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Relatedly, Druckman (1996) found that intra-party disagreements also correlate with coalition 
instability. Specifically, he discovered that coalitions composed of factionalized parties are 
more unstable, compared to coalitions with homogenous parties.  
 
Various institutions have also been regarded as influential for governments' instability. For 
example, positive parliamentarism—i.e., the existence of an investiture vote, has been 
associated with government duration (Saalfeld, 2008, Van Roozendaal, 1997, Warwick, 
1994). Indeed, Ström (1985) argued that governments in countries with investiture vote are 
likely to stay in power for longer periods due to selection: weaker coalitions will not be able 
to pass the investiture vote, making them a rare phenomenon. Rules concerning government 
termination have also been linked to governments' survival rates (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 
2009).   
 
Other institutional structures, for example bi-cameralism or semi-presidentialism (Chiru, 
2015) also affect government stability. Druckman and Thies (2002) suggest bicameralism may 
affect government instability as they find that governments which enjoy upper chamber 
majorities are more durable. Similarly, Chiru (2015) finds government in bi-cameral countries 
to enjoy greater stability.    
 
Another set of variables which relate to government instability revolves around the bargaining 
period that was needed to form the government. Thus, the existence of coalition agreement, 
the time it took for the government to form, or the number of formation attempts (Warwick, 
1994) have all been linked to government duration (Saalfeld, 2008, Van Roozendaal, 1997). 
Chiru (2015) finds a relationship between the pre-electoral coalitions and government 
durability, such that governments in Western and post-communist countries, that were formed 
by pre-electoral coalitions, were less likely to discretionally terminate early.  
 
Lastly, scholars also address the impact of critical events on government duration. Thus, 
scholars find inflation rates and changes in unemployment rates to affect government duration 
(Robertson, 1983; Warwick, 1994, Saalfeld, 2008). Indeed, the stochastic models for 
government instability, argued that government duration is mainly a stochastic process, and 
the likelihood that a government falls depends, by chance, on the occurrence of critical events 
such as economic hardship or war (e.g. Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber, 1986). Laver and 
Shepsle (1998) distinguished among four types of critical events, that may lead to government 
termination: agenda shocks (a polarizing policy is put on the coalitions' agenda for example: 
stem-cell research), policy shocks (e.g., environmental or immigration crisis), decision rule 
chocks and public opinion shocks.  Recently, Hellström and Walther (2017) found that 
economic condition affect government termination only for coalition governments, arguing 
for a conditional effect of economic circumstances and government structure on government 
instability.   
 
A less comprehensive, and yet equally important, is the literature which study the effects of 
government instability on the political system. Scholars address the question about the 
connection between government duration and it quality and agree that the duration of a 
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government is not equal to its overall quality, but duration is one of the pre-conditions of 
effective government (Sartori 1994). Indeed, short-lived cabinets are regarded as ineffective 
policy-makers “because they lack time to develop and implement coherent political programs" 
(Lijphart 1994, 165).  Likewise, government instability is associated with ministerial 
inefficiencies (especially vis-à-vis the bureaucracy (Huber and Lupia, 2000). 
 
Government instability may introduce uncertainty and can consequently lead to economic 
inefficiencies and difficulties (Alesina et. al. 1996), as forming, adopting and implementing 
economic agendas become more difficult. In addition, frequent government turnovers may 
reduce citizens' support in the institutions and erode legitimacy (Harmel and Robertson, 
1986)1.   
 
II. Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Governments  
The literature contains lively debates concerning the definitions and measurements of 
government instability. Even the term that is being used is debated: while some scholars refer 
to government duration or survivability (Somer-Topcu and Williams, 2008; Diermeier and 
Stevenson, 1999; Warwick, 1994; Bright et. al. 2015; Saalfeld, 2008; Maravall, 2009), others 
talk about government's stability or lack thereof (Taylor and Herman, 1971; Huber and 
Martinez-Gallardo, 2004; Harmel and Robertson, 1986; Timmermans and Moury, 2006; 
Grotz and Weber, 2012; Furlong, 1991; Nachmias and Arbel-Ganz, 2005). Still other scholars 
use the terms "duration" "stability", and "survivability" interchangeably (Saalfeld, 2008; 
Conrad and Golder, 2010). While this debate seems inconsequential or negligible, we argue 
it is not. If scholars focus on studying government duration, then conceptualizing it using 
government longevity seems appropriate. But when one focuses on government stability or 
lack thereof, two issues arise: first, it may be inappropriate to conceptualize it solely as 
government longevity and second, the naïve operationalization of government (using three 
criteria prevalent in the literature, as we discuss below) may give rise to issues of measurement 
validity. 
 
With regards to the first concern, we argue that the concept of government (in)stability is 
wider than a mere emphasis on government longevity and should include multiple aspects, for 
example ministerial turnovers, prime ministerial turnovers, and lapsed time between elections, 
to mention a few.  
 
Indeed, the literature have started to pay attention to the multifaceted nature of government 
instability, and for example conceptualized, defined, operationalized and studied ministerial 
turnovers, as a distinct, yet relevant, concept. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2004) challenge 
the conventional operationalization of government instability, which focuses on government 
longevity, and examine the portfolio experience and political experience of ministers in the 
Fourth and Fifth French Republic. They conclude, among other things, that the stability of the 
Fifth Republic—measured solely by government duration—is over-rated. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
1  Although the authors point to the possibility of spuriousness whereby economic performance affect both 
government instability and regime legitimacy.  
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authors find that by operationalizing government instability using ministerial turnovers and 
expertise, the apparent governmental stability of majoritarian systems disappears. In Huber 
and Martinez-Gallardo (2008), the authors base the analysis on individual ministers' stability 
in parliamentary systems and conclude, again, that the relationship between cabinet instability 
and ministerial instability is relatively weak.   
 
Other scholars also shed a light on ministerial turnover as a characteristic of government 
instability. Fischer et. al. (2012) argue that institutional factors such as regime type and party 
systems affect ministers' durability as well as individual level characteristics such as gender 
and age. Bright et. al (2015) examine whether the prestige of the portfolio affect ministerial 
survivability. Examining 7 West European Countries from 1945-2011 they find that ministers 
in more important portfolios are more stable and durable, compared to ministers in less stable 
portfolios. Institutional factors, such as the size of the party the minister belongs to, as well as 
personal characteristics such as age, also affect ministerial survivability. Hansen et. al. (2013), 
suggest that the saliency of certain portfolios affect the durability of ministers and ministerial 
turnover: they argue that higher ranked portfolios are likely to witness less turnover since for 
these highly ranked positions, the candidates for the ministership have been thoroughly 
screened ahead of time. Moreover, they find a conditional effect: when government approval 
rate is in decline prime ministers are less likely to reshuffle or fire important ministers, than 
when approval rates are improving. They find support for the assertion in a dataset for 
Scandinavian countries from post-war period. The findings by Hansen et. al. imply that 
ministerial turnover might be a sign of government stability and strength, rather than an 
indicator of weakness and instability. Indeed, many of the scholars that study ministerial 
instability challenge the naïve perspective of equating ministerial instability with 
governmental weakness (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008, Dewan and Dowding, 2005).   
 
We, therefore, argue that when one wishes to study governmental instability one should 
broaden the scope of measurements used beyond government longevity to include ministerial 
and prime ministerial turnovers, as well as lapsed days between elections. One should also 
bear in mind that (in)stability in one of these indicators does not necessarily imply (in)stability 
in all the other indicators. A country may exhibit high levels of ministerial turnovers while 
experiencing a relative stability with regards to government longevity or prime ministerial 
turnover. Future research will have to examine whether and to what extent the same 
determinants affect each aspect of government instability, and likewise whether they foster 
divergent consequences.  
 
The second concern that arise when one studies government instability involves measurement 
validity. Most of the empirical literature focus on government's longevity, when 
conceptualizing government instability or cabinet survival. Specifically, most scholars use the 
number of days/months a government was in office, oftentimes standardizing it by the 
maximum possible number of days the government can be in office. For example, Sanders 
and Herman (1977) propose to standardize government stability and conclude that the best 
way to do this would be a measure what they call 'government survival' which is a percentage 
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"based on the maximum period of time in which a government can remain in office" (Herman 
and Sanders 1977, 356).  
 
The standard manner by which scholars count government duration rests upon the decision 
concerning what constitutes a government. In other words, in order to count the number of 
days a government was in office, one needs to determine the starting and ending point of a 
government, or put it differently to decide what constitutes a government? In the last two 
decades the standard definition of a new government in the comparative literature/empirical 
data-sets contains three options: a change of government takes place if there is a new prime 
minister, a new election (even if the same prime minister/government continues) or a change 
in party composition and/or parliamentary support of the government (e.g. Woldendorp et al. 
2000, 2011; Müller and Strøm 2000; Müller-Rommel et.al. 2004; Somer-Topcu and Williams 
2008; Browne et. al. 1984).2  
 
While the three criteria mentioned above facilitate comparison across countries, we argue that 
they do not, necessarily, measure governmental instability. The main issue rests with the third 
criterion, namely, that any change in the composition of a government constitutes a new 
government, and consequently is regarded as an empirical manifestation or indicator of 
government instability. The assumption of this measure is that as the number of government 
rises so does the instability. Yet, not all instances of changes in coalitions' partisan 
composition signifies instability.  
 
To begin with, an entrance of a new coalition partner, and an increase in the number of parties 
in the coalition (which constitutes a new government according to this definition) rarely 
indicates governmental instability. Second, even in cases where the number of coalition 
parties is reduced, stability may remain intact. If a withdrawal of a coalition partner leaves the 
coalition majority status unchanged, stability remains largely unaffected. Thus, if a surplus 
coalition witnesses a withdrawal of a partner, which leaves its majority status as a surplus 
coalition, instability is unbothered. On the other hand, if the departure of a partner alters the 
coalitions' majority status from a surplus to either a minimum winning coalition or a minority 
coalition, then stability is hampered. By the same token, if the exit of a coalition partner 
changes the coalition's majority status form a minimum winning coalition to a minority 
government, stability is altered.   
 
Let us bring a few examples to illustrate the anomaly of equating any change of the 
composition of a government as an indication of a new government for the sake of studying 
governments' instability. We begin by providing examples of instances in which the total 
number of coalition parties was reduced without altering the majority status of the 
government, and continue with examples of increasing the coalition's legislative support base.  
Following the 2000 elections in Croatia Račan became the prime minister and he formed a 6-
party center-left surplus coalition (SDP, HSLS, HSS, LS, HNS, IDS). On June 2001, the 
Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) left the government reducing its majority to 117 MPs (out 
                                                 
2 Conrad and Golder (2010) critiqued this definition arguing that caretaker periods following government 
resignation and delays in the government formation process that are largely ignored in most studies of 
parliamentary governments should be taken into account. 
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of a total of 151).  Needless to say the majority status of the coalition stayed intact as the post 
June 2001 coalition remained a surplus coalition. We doubt whether such in instance signifies 
an incident of instability, as the traditional coding of government instability assumes.  
Likewise, after the 1995 Latvian elections, PM Šķēle formed a 7-party coalition, that enjoyed 
the support of 73 MPs (out of a 100). On February 13th, 1997 parliament approved "a new" 
government headed by Šķēle, and supported by 70 members. "The new cabinet differs little 
from the one he [Šķēle (y.s.)] headed for a year" (Jeffries, 2004 p. 191). One has to wonder 
whether such a minute change to the coalition requires scholars to equate it with instability.      
While scholars may debate whether a decrease in the number of coalition partners that does 
not alter the coalition's majority status is a sign of instability or not, there is little reason to 
believe that an increase in the number of coalition partners indicates instability. For example, 
In Israel, during the weeks preceding to the Six Day War (1967), it became apparent that a 
war is imminent. Israel started to quietly prepare for the possibility of a war: enlisting reserve 
units, adding military and civil shielding, and vigorously seeking approval and support from 
allies around the world, mainly the United States (Zalmanovich, 2017).  By June 1st, 1967 - a 
mere 4 days prior to the onset of the war - a national unity coalition was formed, whereby 
prime minister and security minister, Levi Eshkol, enabled (amid public pressure), Gahal and 
Rafi parties to join the coalition, increasing the coalition's legislative support base from 75 
Knesset Members to 111 (out of a total of 120 MKs).  This clear change in the composition 
of the coalition can hardly be regarded as a sign of instability. Yet, by adopting the prevalent 
definition in the literature, this national unity government is counted as a separate government 
than the one that preceded it, and consequently is counted as an evidence for instability.  
 
Adding additional coalition partners does not have to occur because of a war or economic 
crisis. Prime ministers wishing to strengthen their governments, stabilizing the coalitions, and 
diminishing veto power of coalition partners may strive to add more parties to the coalition 
throughout its reign. Tindemans, the 43rd prime minister of Belgium, formed a minority 
government following the 1974 elections. His government, announced on April 24th, 19743, 
enjoyed the support of 102 MPs (out of 212). In June 11th, 1974 the regionalist Walloon Rally 
party (RW) joined the government, altering its majority status, whereby 115 out of 212 MPs 
now supported the government. While the prevalent definition regards the addition of the RW 
as an indication for a formation of a new government, and consequently as a sign of instability, 
we contend that increasing the number of coalition partners does not imply instability.  
 
Likewise, following the 2015 elections in Israel, Netanyahu was appointed, by the president 
on March 25th as the formature, and the negotiation process began. On April 20th, he was 
awarded a 14 days’ extension, during which coalition agreements were signed between Likud 
and 4 parties (Kulanu, The Jewish Home, Shas and Yahadut Hatorah). on May 6th—the last 
day of the extension period—Bibi announced he was able to form a minimum winning center-
right coalition and an investiture vote was supported by 61 MKs. Interestingly, Yisrael 
Beiteinu—headed by Lieberman—which is regarded as a natural partner in a center-right 
coalition remained in the opposition. After a year, Netanyahu and Lieberman signed a 
coalition agreement, officially increasing the support base of the coalition from 61 to 67, 
                                                 
3 Ipu data: < http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/BELGIUM_1974_E.PDF>  
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alleviating the veto player status of two coalition partners (Shas and Yahadut Hatorah)4. 
During the press conference held while signing the coalition agreement Bibi said: "since 
forming the government, a year ago I emphasized time and again that I intend to broaden it. 
Israel needs government stability to deal with the challenges ahead…"(Lis, 2016). While the 
traditional coding assigns a new coalition number for this newly formed government, we argue 
that one cannot associate Yisrael Beyteinu's entering the coalition with instability.  
 
Thus, we argue that the traditional measure of government instability, which equates any 
change in the partisan composition of the government as an instance of a new government and 
therefore as an indicator of instability inflates instability at least for some countries. In what 
follows we examine in which countries government instability was inflated.  
 
III. Re-constructing government instability   
In light of the above-mentioned pitfalls, we propose to re-construct the concept of government 
instability. To begin with, and in light of the examples of empirical anomalies we presented 
above, we argue that the definition of a government scholars uses to measure government 
instability is flawed. Specifically, we do not believe that any change in a government's partisan 
composition or a government's legislative support base should constitute an indication of a 
new government (for the sake of operationalizing government instability). Rather we propose 
that only changes in cabinet composition that alter the government's majority status should be 
counted as indication of a new government, and hence as symptoms of instability. 
Specifically, we created two alternative counting rules. While we adopt the first and second 
criteria—i.e., new PM and new elections as indicating the beginning of a new government, 
we modify the third condition. We argue that only changes in coalitions' partisan composition, 
which alter its majority status, should be counted as new governments, and consequently 
regarded as indications of instability.  
 
Formally, rule 1 counts a new government when either 1. a government is formed after 
elections or 2. a new PM is sworn in or 3: the coalitions' partisan composition changes, such 
that it alters its majority status from a MWC to a minority government or from a surplus 
government to either a MWC or a minority government. Under Rule 1, addition of parties to 
the government do not entails the creation of a new government for the sake of studying 
government instability. Rule 2 counts a new government when either 1. a government is 
formed after elections or 2. a new PM is sworn in or 3: partisan composition changes alter the 
majority status of a coalition as follows: a. from a MWC to a minority government; b. from a 
surplus government to either a MWC or a minority government; c. from a minority 
government to a MWC or surplus coalition; d. from a MWC to a surplus government. Rule 2, 
thus, enables one to infer instability also in instances in which the number of coalition parties’ 
increases, but only in cases where such a change alters the majority status of the government.  
 
In the following results section, we present preliminary analysis of the distribution of 
instability under the two newly proposed rules, and juxtapose them against the traditional 
                                                 
4  Kulanu and the Jewish Home remain veto players.   
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operationalization. As will become evident, for some countries, there are rather large 
differences across the three definitions. In the future we intend to study whether our 
understanding concerning the determinants of instability changes based on our modified 
operationalization.   
   
We further argue, similar to Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2004), that other indicators, beside 
government duration, should also be considered when studying government' instability. For 
example, we think scholars should pay greater attention to the instability of personnel who 
hold key cabinet positions. We, therefore, look at additional indicators such as the continuous 
tenure of a prime minister or ministerial durability. We farther look at lapsed time between 
elections as an additional indicator for government instability. As we claimed before, we 
anticipate that some countries might be regarded as extremely unstable on one indicator, yet 
exhibit relative stability on another. In the future we will study how this nuanced 
understanding of instability shape our knowledge concerning the determinants and 
consequences of government instability.   
 
IV. Preliminary Results    
 
4.1  Government longevity 
Given our critique on the operationalization of government longevity, we established new 
ways to measure government duration—ones that more accurately depict certain changes in 
cabinet composition as government instability while leave other alternations be. As 
mentioned, both new counting rules leave the first two conditions for the establishment of a 
new government intact. Thus, under both, rule 1 and rule 2, a new government is formed when 
either elections occur, or a new PM is sworn in. The departure from the traditional 
operationalization (among which ParlGov's) is evident in the third condition. While ParlGov 
considers any change in partisan composition to constitute a new government, our modified 
rule 1 considers a new government only when composition changes alter the government's 
majority status from a MWC to a minority government or from a surplus government to either 
a MWC or a minority government. Rule 2 is more inclusive, as it considers partisan 
composition changes as a new government when it changes the government's majority status 
from a MWC to a minority government; from a surplus government to either a MWC or a 
minority government; from a minority government to a MWC or surplus coalition; and lastly 
from a MWC to a surplus government.  
 
Figures 1-3 present the number of governments in the ParlGov dataset under the three 
counting rules. Thus, using the three figures we can compare the prevalent ParlGov definition 
with our modified rule 1 and rule 2. It is worth noting that the earliest date to enter our 
calculation is 1945 (post WW2). Yet, time exposure differs across the countries. For example, 
Israel first appears in 1949, Greece in 1974, Portugal in 1976 and Romania in 1990.  
 
 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 96 
11 
 
 
Figure 1: Ordered Number of Governments, ParlGov Definition 
 
 
Figure 2: Ordered Number of Governments, Definition 1 
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While we cannot compare the order of the countries according to the number of governments 
they experience within a single figure (since the time exposure of each country differ), we can 
look at whether and to what degree using alternative measurements for government longevity 
changes the number of government a certain country witnessed, and compare whether using 
these alternative measure changes the rank order of the countries from one figure to the other. 
  
To begin with, one can see that measurements matter. Using different operationalization of 
government longevity, and counting more accurately changes to governments' composition 
which signifies instability, significantly reduces the number of governments some countries 
witnessed, and alter the order of the countries according to the number of governments they 
had. Thus, when using ParlGov traditional counting, Israel exhibits the largest number of 
governments (70) to be followed by Italy (65) and France (62). However, when one uses rule 
1 which considers composition changes as a new cabinet only when they alter the majority 
status of the government (from MWC to a minority government or from a surplus government 
to either a MWC or a minority government), Israel "looses" its superiority with regards to 
government instability, as it is ranked 6th (from the top) with 36 governments, which 
constitutes a reduction of nearly 50% in the number of governments. It is also worth noting, 
that the number of Israel governments under rule 1 (36) is closer to the count of governments 
by Israel itself: the current government in Israel is regarded as the 34th government.  While 
the change for Israel is massive, other countries also experience a significant reduction in the 
number of governments they experience, and consequently their levels of instability. Under 
rule 1 France exhibit the greatest instability with 53 governments (a reduction of 14.5% in the 
number of governments), and Finland and Italy follow suit with 48 and 46 governments, 
respectively (a reduction of 13% and 29%, respectively). Under Rule 2 the 4 most unstable 
countries are France with 53 governments, Italy and Finland, each with 49 governments, and 
Israel with 42 governments. 
 
Figures 1-3 demonstrate that using what we believe are more valid measures to count 
governments for the sake of measuring governments' instability changes the total number of 
governments certain countries experienced, and consequently their perceived level of 
government instability. It sometimes even changes the rank order of the countries according 
to their instability levels. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that while the changes in 
absolute value in instability are significant (and can reach up to 50%), the rank-order 
correlation between the three measurements are high. Tau-b correlation between Rule 1 and 
ParlGov definition stands on 0.9, and Tau-b correlation between Rule 2 and ParlGov is 0.92. 
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Figure 3: Ordered Number of Governments Definition 2 
 
 
We now turn to examine government duration and the rank order of countries according to 
this measure. Table 1 presents, for each of the 32 countries in the ParlGov dataset, the average 
government duration (measured by the number of days), according to ParlGov, Rule 1 and 
Rule 2. It farther presents the percent difference in average duration between ParlGov defini-
tion, and each of our modified measures (Rule 1 and Rule 2).  It is evident that some countries 
witness a major change in their government longevity when we use our new measures. For 
instance, the Czech Republic witness an increase of government duration of about 25% from 
an average of 645 days, under ParlGov count, to an average of 808.25 days under Rule 1. 
Likewise, Romania more than doubled its government longevity, as the average number of 
days a government survived increased from 412 days to about 870 days.  
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Figure 4 presents the average government duration (measured in days) according to ParlGov, 
Rule 1 and Rule 2, whereby the order by which the countries appear in the figure is determined 
by the rank order according to ParlGov's definition.  It is evident that while for some countries 
utilizing the modified measurements yields little to no change in government longevity, for 
other countries the change is profound.  Thus, whereas on average a government lasted in 
Israel less than 1 year, according to ParlGov's definition, it lasted more than 2 years under 
Rule 1. Likewise, an average duration of a Croatian government stood at about a year and a 
half when one uses ParlGov's measurement, but rose to over two and a half years if one uses 
Rule 1.  
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Figure 4: Ordered Average Government Duration (in days) 
 
 
 
What is more important is that the increase in government longevity, depending on whether 
one uses ParlGov, Rule 1 or Rule 2, is not distributed randomly or equally across the countries. 
It seems the less stable countries according to ParlGov's definition are the ones that witness 
the most significant increase in government's longevity measured by Rule 1 and Rule 2.  Thus 
only 4 countries out of the 16 most stable countries exhibit a longevity change larger than 
20%, whereas 11 out of the 16 least stable countries witness such an increased longevity. 
Likewise, the increase in average government duration (between ParlGov and Rule 1) for the 
16 most stable countries is 12.87%, whereas this increase in government duration for the 16 
least stable countries is 41.18%, a clearly significant difference. This non-random effect may 
indicate a systemic bias in our current understanding of the determinants of government 
instability, which is based on the traditional definition used by ParlGov. We intend to study 
whether the impact of prevalent predictors found in the literature to affect government 
instability remains intact, given the alternations of the measurement we advocate for.  
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4.2  Additional indicators for government instability 
As we indicated earlier in the paper, not only do we believe the measurement for government 
instability, which is based on government longevity, is inflicted with measurement validity 
issues, but we also contend that the concept of government instability is broader than a mere 
focus on government longevity. While section A of the results dealt with our first concern, we 
now turn to looking at additional conceptualizations and measures for government instability. 
We compare government instability measured by ParlGov's government longevity with PM 
durability, taken form the ParlGov dataset as well5.  
 
Figure 5 compares government duration and PM duration, while the countries are rank ordered 
of the governments' durations. It is evident, that for most countries, governmental stability 
operationalized by PM longevity is much higher than the stability of governments measured 
by governments' longevity (only in Bulgaria does government longevity equal PM longevity). 
Moreover, while for some countries the decision whether to operationalize government 
instability using government longevity or using PM longevity is almost inconsequential with 
regards to their rank-ordering on instability, for other countries such a decision is significant. 
Thus, whereas Latvia is ranked as the second least stable with regards to government 
longevity, it is also ranked as the third least stable with regards to PM tenure duration. 
Similarly, Italy is deemed extremely unstable on both the government as well as the PM 
longevity measures (3rd and 5th, respectively).  On the other hand, for other countries the 
decision to conceptualize government stability with government longevity or PM longevity is 
crucial. Thus, whereas Sweden is ranked as the most stable country with regards to PM tenure, 
it is ranked only 7, when one uses government longevity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 ParlGov measures the continuous length of a PM tenure. Thus in the instance in which elections did not replace 
the PM, the counting clock is not set to zero. On the other and, if PM A served in office, was replaced by PM B, 
and then returned to office, we set to zero the counting clock (for the second term).   
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Figure 5: Government and PM longevity ordered by ParlGov 
 
 
 
Astonishingly, while Israel is ranked as the most unstable country with regards to government 
longevity, it is at the top 1/3 stable countries, measured with PM continuous tenure duration. 
Indeed, Tau-b correlation between government duration (defined by ParlGov) and PM 
duration is 0.55, indicating that some countries might be characterized as unstable on one 
measure, but as stable on the other. Future research will examine whether the determinants 
that affect government longevity also affect PM longevity, and whether the consequences of 
each type of instability are similar or not.  
 
An additional aspect of government's instability relates to ministerial duration in office 
(Fischer et. al. 2012, Bright et. al. 2015). We compare government longevity as defined by 
ParlGov with the continuous length of ministers in office. To that end we use Seki and Laron 
(2014) data-set, which defines ministers' duration in office as follows: the starting date of a 
minister in a given portfolio is either: 1) the date of the government's tenure, or b) the date at 
which the minister, as a replacement, took office. The end date of a minister tenure is defined 
as either 1) the end of the government's tenure, 2) the date at which the minister was replaced6.    
                                                 
6 When ministers are replaced in the middle of a government's tenure, the previous minister's end date is the 
replacing minister's start date (minus one day).  
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Figure 6 juxtaposes governments' duration and ministers' duration, where countries are 
ordered by the governments' longevity measures7. It is evident that while for some countries 
operationalizing government instability as either government longevity or ministerial duration 
yield substantively similar conclusions (e.g., Norway or the Netherlands), for other countries 
ministerial instability is much larger than governmental instability. Indeed, tau-b ranked order 
correlation between governments' and minister's duration in office stands on 0.67, indicating 
that while correlated, these two measures may tap into divergent aspects of government 
instability.  
 
The last aspect of government instability we examine relates to the lapsed time between 
elections. Minister Steiniz from Israel's Likud party said in an interview, days after PM 
Netanyahu called for the 2015 early elections that the upcoming elections are about 
governability. There is a real chance, continued Steiniz, that Israel will reach Italy's status, 
with elections every year and unstable governments. We contend, similar to our discussion 
about the other indicators for government's instability, that there isn't, and should not be, a 
direct link between lapsed tome between elections and government longevity. Thus, a country 
might be characterized by short lived governments concurrently with elections that tend to be 
held on time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Seki and Laron (2014) do not define 'a government' in the exact why ParlGov does. These differences enable 
the anomaly that average ministers' duration, estimated form Seki's and Laron's data, would be larger than the 
average government's duration, estimated via ParlGov. In fact, out of 30 countries for which data was available, 
11 countries experienced longer ministerial duration than governmental duration. We intend to remedy this pitfall 
by re-calculating, in the future, ministers' duration in office according to ParlGov, Rule 1 and Rule 2. 
Interpretation of Figure 6 should, therefore, bare this caveat in mind.  
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Figure 6: Average Governments' and Ministers' Duration ordered by ParlGov 
 
 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 present countries' lapsed time between elections alongside their average 
governments' duration. While Figure 7 presents the row number of days between elections 
(and countries are ranked according to this later variable), Figure 8 present the lapsed time 
between elections as a percentage of the maximum possible time between mandatory elections 
as is prescribed by each country's laws (and countries are ranked according to this variable)8.  
Figures 7 and 8 reveal that the relationships between government longevity and lapsed times 
between elections, or government longevity and lapsed times between elections as a 
percentage of the maximum legal time, are weak (tab-b= 0.15 and 0.04, respectively).  
 
                                                 
8 We in fact use a crude measure to calculate to maximum legal number of days between elections: we multiple 
the maximum number of years between elections by 365 days. This is a simplistic measure since in some 
countries the rules for when elections are to be held are more detailed than a mere count of the number of 
years/days between one election cycle to the other.    
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Figure 7: Average Government Duration and Time between Elections, ordered by 
Time between Elections 
 
 
 
Moreover, comparing Figure 7 to Figure 8 reveals significant changes: thus, while when using 
the row number of days between elections Australia is classified as the most unstable country, 
when we use the more accurate standardized measure, we discover that it is ranked at the top 
half of the distribution. Indeed, Australia's position as the least stable with regards to its row 
number of days between elections stem from the fact that its parliament is elected every 3 
years. Italy, experience the opposite effect: while it is ranked 7th from the top when one 
measures the average number of days between election, it drops to the bottom half of the 
distribution when we calibrate the measure using the maximum legal days between elections. 
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Figure 8: Average Government Duration and Percent Time between Elections, ordered 
by Percent Time between Elections 
 
 
 
The fact that the decision, to standardize the number of days between elections by the 
maximum time allotted by law, alters our inference regarding stability is not surprising or 
novel. Yet comparing Figure 8 to Figure 9—the order of countries' stability based upon their 
governments' average longevity (ParlGov) to the order of countries' stability based upon their 
standardized times between elections—is. For example, while Israel is ranked as the least 
stable according to ParlGov measure, it is ranked 12th from the top when measuring stability 
with the average lapsed times between elections as a percentage of the maximum possible 
time. It seems despite Steiniz' comment, Israel does not exhibit frequent elections in 
comparative perspective. Similarly, while Romania is located as the fourth least stable when 
we look at government longevity, it is ranked as the 7th most stable when we measure the 
standardized times between elections. On the other hand, Denmark, which is located at the 
top half of the distribution of government longevity, is the second least stable with regards to 
the average number of days between elections as a percentage of the maximum time possible.  
Once again the analysis reveals a country may be characterized as unstable according to one 
definition, but as stable in another (and vice versa).  
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Figure 9: Average Government Duration and Percent Time between Elections, ordered 
by ParlGov 
 
 
Last, we compare countries' average time laps between elections as percentage of the total 
legal maximum to countries' government duration as percentage of the total legal maximum 
possible. Figure 10 indicates that instability measured by percent government duration is 
larger than instability measures as percent lapsed time between elections. Moreover, and once 
again, the data disclose that there is a weak relationship between the two measured of 
instability (tau-b=0.1).  Indeed, while Spain seems to be the most stable when we rank order 
countries according to the standardized government duration, it is located in the middle of the 
distribution when we operationalize instability in terms of times between elections as 
percentage of the total maximum possible. Finland, on the other hand shows an opposite trend: 
while it is classified as the 4th most stable country when we look at percent times between 
elections, it is the 8th least stable country when we look at government longevity as a 
percentage of the maximum possible longevity. Italy and Israel, which are classified as the 
least and 3rd least stable countries measured by the standardized government longevity 
measure, seems more stable when one measures the average time between elections as a share 
of the maximum time allowed (Italy is ranked 11 and Israel is ranked 21 out of 32 countries). 
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Figure 10: Average Percent Government Duration and Percent Time between 
Elections, ordered by ParlGov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Parametric Survival Analysis  
Figure 11 presents the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric survival curve of four of the measures 
we presented in the analysis above: we compare the survivor function of the traditional 
ParlGov definition for government instability, our modified measurements of Rule 1 and Rule 
2, and a measure of prime ministerial instability. It is evident that while Rules 1 and 2 yield 
very similar survival functions, the decision to operationalize and measure government 
instability as either ParlGov's measurement, our modified Rule 1 or via prime ministerial 
continuous tenure is consequential. Indeed, the survival function of the prime ministerial 
tenure measure is much flatter than the one for the government duration. Moreover, the 
survival function of Rules 1 and 2 indicate that in comparison to the ParlGov's definition, 
governments survive longer.  
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Figure 11: Kaplen-Meier Survivor Functions for ParlGov, Rule 1, Rule 2 and Prime 
Ministers' Duration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the probability that a government last longer than the median ParlGov's duration (=438 
days) is 0.56 under the ParlGov definition and 0.65 under Rule 1. The probability that a prime 
minister resides longer than ParlGov's median is 0.64. Likewise, the probability that a ParlGov 
government lasts longer than the median of government duration under Rule 1 (=669 days) is 
0.39, while this probability for Rule 1's government is 0.5. As we mentioned earlier, future 
research will study parametric Cox Proportional Hazard Models, to examine whether and to 
what extent predictors that have been identified in past research as crucial for explaining 
government instability are still vital in explaining instability measured by Rules 1 and 2, or 
prime ministers' duration.   
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Conclusions 
Government instability is an important phenomenon that has been studied extensively from 
both theoretical as well as empirical perspectives. Many times scholars, as well as politicians, 
equate government instability with general instability of the political system. In this paper, we 
argue that the prevalent conceptualization and definitions used in the literature are too narrow 
and flawed. Specifically, we argue that the exclusive focus on government longevity when 
conceptualizing and empirically studying government instability is limiting our understanding 
of the determinants and consequences of instability, and especially the pressing issue of the 
relationship between governmental instability and political instability. We add additional 
three conceptualizations for government instability, namely prime minister turnover, 
ministerial turnover, and lapsed times between elections, and demonstrate that the additional 
aspects of government instability are distinct from government longevity. Thus, countries that 
are classified as unstable with regards to government longevity, may be classified as stable 
with regards to the other conceptualizations.  
 
Future research will first address what are the commonalities across countries that exhibit 
similar patterns of instability throughout the various conceptualizations. We further intend to 
examine the determinants and consequences of each type of government instability (prime 
minister turnover, ministerial turnover, and lapsed days between elections), and especially 
their combination. We want to study what the combination of stability and instability across 
the various operationalizations tells us about the political system. For example, do prime 
ministers that deal with governments that witness significant ministerial turnover behave 
differently than prime ministers who preside over a relatively stable government from this 
perspective? Additionally, are policy changes more frequent in countries that witness 
instability on both government longevity as well as prime ministerial turnover, than in 
countries characterized by short lived governments, concurrent with stable prime ministerial 
duration? We further want to study which of the attributes of government instability 
contributes more to citizens' perceived levels of instability and why?   
 
Not only do we advocate broadening up the spectrum of government instability above and 
beyond the prevalent focus on government duration, we also critique the prevalent 
operationalization of government duration itself, arguing and demonstrating it inflates levels 
of instability (at least for some countries). The literature, which equates government instability 
with government longevity, counts the number of governments and their durations. To this 
end, scholars have to define what constitutes a new government.  The common definition and 
operationalization relies on a combination of three criteria. One counts it as a new government 
if (1) elections occurred; (2) the prime minister changed; and (3) any change to the partisan 
composition of the cabinet occurred. We argue that the third criterion artificially inflates 
government instability. Not every change in a coalitions' partisan composition signifies 
instability. A surplus coalition, which loses one of its partners, while maintaining its surplus 
status, most likely does not intensify government instability. Moreover, adding coalition 
partners, especially in times of crisis (like war or economic hardship) can hardly be regarded 
as a sign of instability. We therefore advocate using more realistic counting rules, ones which 
only considers changes to the government partisan composition as an indicator of government 
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instability, if these changes alter the majority status of the coalition. Using these narrower, but 
to our understanding more precise, counting rules reveals that at least for some countries this 
change has profound consequences. Moreover, the increase in government longevity evident 
while using our modified counting rules, is not distributed randomly or equally across 
countries. The least stable countries according to the established definition are the ones that 
witness the most noteworthy increase in government stability measured by our modified rules. 
This non-random effect may indicate a systemic bias in our current understanding of the 
determinants of government instability. We indeed aim to study whether the causes of 
government instability remain intact once we use the more accurate measure of government 
longevity.  
 
Our new measurement can affect previous and future research on government instability and 
political instability more generally. Since we question the commonly used definition of 
government instability and offered new measurements, previous findings should be 
reexamined in order to see whether their conclusions are still the same or the literature can 
gain new insights that may affect daily life in democracies. For example, studies that analyzed 
how politics (measured by cabinet changes) affects economic performance (Alesina et.al. 
1996; Aisen and Veiga 2013; Hellström and Walther 2017), or studies about government 
formation, portfolio allocation and formateurs’ bonuses which had opposing conclusions 
(Warwick and Druckman 2006; Carroll and Cox 2007; Hansen et. al. 2013; Falcó-Gimeno 
and Indridason   2013; Bright et. al 2015) should be re-examined in light of our critique. As 
Heraclitus insistence on ever-present change as being the fundamental essence of the universe, 
we suggest to embrace the theoretical and empirical change we offer regarding government 
instability and reexamine previous finding in order to have a better understanding for the 
future. 
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